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Abstract 
This paper provides a concise introduction to and evaluation of the Lake Taupo nitrogen 
cap and trade program established as part of Waikato Regional Council‟s recent Regional Plan 
Variation Five. The policy establishes a catchment-wide cap on nitrogen losses by allocating 
farmers individual nitrogen discharge allowances and allowing those farmers flexibility to trade 
allowances amongst themselves and to sell allowances to a public fund while remaining within 
the overall catchment cap. This paper seeks to explain the structure and evolution of the 
nitrogen trading market and to analyse its impact thus far by drawing on a wide variety of 
relevant perspectives. Research drawn from written material and basic quantitative data provide 
the basis for analysing the policy, while interviews with relevant stakeholders provide insight into 
the successful, surprising and contentious issues which arose throughout its development and 
implementation. 
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1. Introduction 
Known for its pristine water quality and breathtaking views, Lake Taupo and the 
surrounding catchment exists as an iconic feature of New Zealand‟s North Island for residents 
and tourists alike (Petch et al., 2003). As the country‟s largest, Lake Taupo stretches 30 kilometres 
wide and 40 kilometres long (Young et al., 2010). The 3,497 square kilometre catchment 
surrounding the lake plays host to a range of pastoral, forestry, urban and conservation land 
uses1. Those who benefit socially, economically and culturally from a healthy lake share a strong 
appreciation for the high quality of the lake‟s waters. Indeed, over 90% of landholders expressed 
that preserving the quality of the water is a top priority for the region (Environment Waikato, 
2003).  
 
1.1. Motivation: water quality decline and policy response 
Although Lake Taupo currently exhibits exceptional water quality, a gradual increase in 
catchment land development over the past century threatens to substantially impact future water 
quality if left unchecked by an effective policy intervention. Recent scientific investigation has 
revealed a gradual but steady decline in the water quality of Lake Taupo over the past three 
decades, as evidenced by elevated levels of nutrients in the water (Vant, 2008). These 
investigations have confirmed the connection between intensified pastoral and urban land use 
over the past 35-50 years and the observed increase in nutrient levels (Young, 2007). As a result 
of both natural and human-induced processes, nutrients such as nitrogen enter the lake‟s waters 
and support growing algal populations which in turn reduce overall water clarity (Vant, 2008). In 
this way, intensification of land development in the catchment threatens to reduce Lake Taupo‟s 
water quality as measured in terms of nutrient density and water clarity. 
In particular, nitrogen losses stemming from agricultural land uses have been identified 
as the primary threat to water quality. Total nitrogen discharges into the lake amount to an 
estimated 1360 tonnes per year, of which 804 tonnes per year originate from natural or 
unmanageable sources compared to 556 tonnes per year from manageable or human-induced 
sources. Pastoral activities alone account for 92% of all manageable sources of nitrogen loss, and 
thus provide the most promising avenue for achieving nitrogen reductions to protect water 
quality 2. In the Lake Taupo catchment, it can take decades for nutrient losses in various parts of 
                                                 
1 See appendix ‎6.1 for a map of catchment land uses over time and appendix ‎6.3 for a breakdown of land uses 
within the catchment  
2 See appendix ‎6.4 for a breakdown of sources of nitrogen within the catchment 
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the catchment to impact observed water quality. Because of the gradual progression from surface 
land to groundwater to lake water, there exists a considerable time lag between the activity 
causing nutrient discharge and the consequence of that discharge on water quality indicators 
(Vant, 2008). As a result scientists anticipate a continued decline in water quality as the impact of 
past decades is felt, even without further land use intensification. 
This situation has motivated the development of a water management policy that 
preserves Lake Taupo‟s water quality by taking into consideration the impact of past, current and 
future land uses. Charged with the responsibility for developing such a policy, Waikato Regional 
Council (WRC, formerly Environment Waikato) set as a goal to restore water quality to 2001 
levels by the year 2080. Importantly, WRC aims to achieve this goal while minimizing economic 
costs and sharing costs among local, regional and national communities (Environment Court 
New Zealand, 2011). In addition to preventing further increases in nitrogen losses each year, 
WRC determined that a 20% reduction in nitrogen losses across the catchment would be 
necessary to achieve this water quality goal (Vant, 2008).  
Since agricultural activities targeted as the main source of nitrogen losses are key 
activities for agricultural businesses, policy measures to reduce nitrogen losses by capping or 
reducing farm production could have a significant impact on economic outcomes for farmers. 
Farm management changes aimed at reducing nitrogen losses such as lowering stocking rates or 
changing grazing patterns could shrink profits and prove very costly for farmers. Thus we would 
expect that any policy mandating certain farm management practices to limit nitrogen losses 
would place a significant financial burden on these farmers. Additionally, mandated farm 
management practices would severely restrict farmer flexibility to make individualized business 
decisions and would remove any incentive to seek other ways of reducing nitrogen losses 
associated with agricultural production. Similarly, any policy that calls for voluntary management 
changes by landowners would be ineffective, as few farmers would choose to adopt practices 
that limit nitrogen losses at the expense of profits if not required to do so (Ledgard, 2007). 
It is within this context that WRC has developed Regional Plan Variation 5 (RPV5), an 
innovative water management policy which establishes a cap on nitrogen and seeks to 
permanently reduce nitrogen losses across the catchment3. In addition to various wastewater 
regulations not relevant to the current discussion, the policy consists of several main 
components. The first is a cap on all nitrogen discharges across the catchment which requires 
landowners to maintain nitrogen losses at current levels as specified by individual nitrogen 
                                                 
3 See final version of RPV5, fully operative 7/7/2011 (Environment Court New Zealand, 2011) 
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discharge allowances. The second is a permanent 20% reduction in nitrogen discharges across 
the catchment which a publicly funded trust will achieve through the purchase and conversion of 
land or purchase and permanent retirement of nitrogen allowances.  
A final key component of the policy is the establishment of a nitrogen trading scheme. 
This system provides farmers the flexibility to trade units of nitrogen allowances with other 
farmers or with the publicly funded trust. The policy allows for farmers to increase their own 
nitrogen losses above their individual allowance as long as that nitrogen increase is offset by an 
equivalent decrease elsewhere in the catchment by another farmer. The trading system is 
designed to provide farmers the flexibility to change management practices while preserving the 
overall catchment cap on nitrogen and thus ensuring that water quality targets are met. 
 
1.2. Research focus and methodology 
A nitrogen cap and trade program provides what could prove a powerful policy solution 
for addressing the water quality issues facing Lake Taupo. Given the intention of the policy to 
achieve a water quality target and provide farmers with additional flexibility, this paper seeks to 
analyse and evaluate the impact of the policy thus far. Our research seeks to identify useful 
lessons for this catchment and for other water management cases in New Zealand and abroad. 
  Our research draws on written materials, trading activity data and detailed interviews 
with stakeholders to provide context surrounding the development of the policy and the basis 
off of which to analyse the impact of the nutrient trading system. 
 
1.3. Main findings and interpretation 
While a nitrogen cap and trade system presents an innovative and significant policy 
solution, there have been several practical obstacles to designing and implementing the policy. 
Establishing the level of the cap needed to reach the environmental target has involved several 
key decisions which determine how land use activities and climatic conditions translate into a 
baseline measurement of nitrogen losses. Furthermore, determining a nitrogen reduction target 
has required close consideration of the complex science that governs the movement of nitrogen 
into the lake and the impact of that nitrogen on water quality over time. For example, while the 
20% reduction target strikes a balance between scientific uncertainty, environmental goals and 
social and economic impacts there exists concern that additional reduction may eventually be 
needed to restore the quality of the lake‟s waters (Vant, 2008). 
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Beyond imposing a catchment-wide cap on nitrogen losses, establishing individual 
tradable allowances for a collection of diffuse non-point sources of nitrogen spread across the 
catchment presents a unique policy challenge. Losses from non-point compared to point sources 
such as large factories are more difficult to measure and monitor, and require reliable estimation 
and modelling to quantify (Greenhalgh, 2008a). Indeed WRC is the first worldwide to take on 
the challenge of establishing a non-point source nutrient trading system as a water quality 
solution. Although allowance trading applies mainly to agricultural landowners, the policy has 
impacted a wide variety of landowners in the catchment. The Ngati Tuwharetoa, as owners of 
some 40% of catchment land as well as owners and caretakers of the lake bed itself have a 
particular interest in and responsibility to protect the quality of the lake water (Young et al., 
2010). Forestry owners also stand to feel the impact of the policy as the grandparenting of 
allowances locks them into low nitrogen uses and threatens to restrict further development. This 
wide variety of stakeholders has made ownership and inclusion in the development process and 
satisfaction with the final policy design a challenging but nevertheless important process (Yerex, 
2009).  
Although RPV5 is yet a young policy and we should be careful to draw hard and fast 
conclusions regarding its impact, evidence indicates that the nitrogen cap has effectively limited 
nitrogen losses into the lake while the public fund and trading system have provided valuable 
flexibility to landowners. While a strict cap would otherwise prevent farmers from expanding 
production or converting land to a more profitable but more nitrogen-intensive use, including an 
allowance trading component has served to make the cap less restrictive. Given the option to 
buy or sell nitrogen, farmers can consider the relative costs and benefits to be gained from 
making management or land use changes that will enable them to increase production and 
purchase nitrogen, or decrease production and sell nitrogen4. In this way, farmers have enjoyed 
some limited flexibility in terms of land use and production intensity and so have been able to 
achieve nitrogen reductions at a minimal cost (Greenhalgh, 2008a and Greenhalgh, 2008b). The 
Lake Taupo trading system is still immature, however, the principles of flexibility provided by an 
allowance trading program have provided an intriguing market-based way to minimise the cost 
of reducing nitrogen losses, something that could not have been achieved by a regulated cap 
alone. 
 
                                                 
4 See (Greenhalgh, 2008a) and WRC‟s Nitrogen Sourcing and Trading in the Lake Taupo Catchment (Environment 
Waikato, 2010) for a description of the conditions under which trading might occur and how the trading process 
takes place 
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1.4. Structure of paper 
Section ‎2 provides an overview of the structure of the policy and the nutrient trading 
system established as a core element of the policy. Section ‎3 goes on to outline various key 
decisions taken during the development of the policy which provide context for understanding 
and interpreting the impact of the policy. Section ‎4 provides the bulk of the analysis and 
evaluation of the policy overall and the trading system in particular, and is followed by a brief 
conclusion in section ‎5.  
 
2. Overview of policy design and nitrogen trading market 
This section provides a general overview of the design of RPV5 with reference to each of 
the rules relevant to the nitrogen trading system and an overview of the trading market structure. 
Since its early stages in 2000, RPV5 has undergone several iterations and years of review in the 
Environment Court of New Zealand before its finalisation in July 20115. The final version 
specifies rules that address who is covered by the cap, how nitrogen allowances are measured 
and allocated and how nitrogen allowances can be traded.  
In order to account for nitrogen losses around the catchment, various land uses are 
classified as permitted, controlled or non-complying activities and regulated accordingly6. The 
nutrient trading system applies to those dry stock and dairy farming activities which result in 
substantial nitrogen losses that need to be measured and accounted for under the catchment-
wide cap as controlled activities7. As controlled activities, farmers engaging in these land uses are 
required to apply for a resource consent with the Waikato Regional Council. This process 
requires farmers to establish an individualised nitrogen discharge allowance (NDA) based on 
                                                 
5 See appendix ‎1.1 for a timeline of important events in the development of RPV5. 
6 Permitted activities are those whose nitrogen discharges are so minimal as to not require formal approval, 
benchmarking or measurement. These include low-nitrogen leaching farming activities as specified by rule 
3.10.5.1. Rule 3.10.5.1 applies to farms leaching less than 8 kg/ha/year, and specifies certain stocking and fertiliser 
application limits. It is estimated that there are approximately 900-1200 such lifestyle farming blocks which 
together only account for 5% of all pastoral land in the catchment. Rule 3.10.5.2 applies to non-farming activities 
such as indigenous vegetation, forestry and golf courses conditional on certain nitrogen fertiliser application limits. 
Rule 3.10.5.12 assumes background leaching of 2 kg/ha/year for unimproved land and 3 kg/ha/year for 
plantation forestry. Low-nitrogen leaching activities resulting from the development of undeveloped or forestry 
land are classified as controlled activities under rules 3.10.5.4 and 3.10.5.5 and are subject to slightly different 
regulation. These rules permit the development of Maori and non-Maori lands by allowing landowners to exceed 
pre-determined background nitrogen leaching rates by 2 kg/ha/year for a collective total of 11,000 kg and 3,100 
kg respectively. Non-complying activities as specified by rule 3.10.5.9 are those not defined as either permitted 
or controlled activities by rules 3.10.5.1 to 3.10.5.8. 
7 Rule 3.10.5.3 classifies nitrogen leaching farming activities as controlled activities. Note that lands converting 
from non-pastoral to pastoral uses after July 2005 must apply either as a permitted activity under rule 3.10.5.1 as a 
low nitrogen leaching farming activity or as a controlled activity under rule 3.10.5.3 as a nitrogen leaching farming 
activity. 
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exiting management practices and demonstrate ongoing adherence to that NDA8. Figure 1 
summarizes the size of existing farms in the catchment. It is estimated that all farms greater than 
20 ha and roughly 50 of those farms smaller than 20 ha will be required to apply for a resource 
consent as controlled activities,  for a total of approximately 250 properties. 
 
Property Size 
Number of 
Properties 
Total Area 
(ha) (Includes 
retired land) 
Percent of 
Catchment 
Land 
Less than 20 hectares 900 - 1206    5% 
Between 20 and 100 hectares 100 4221 8% 
Greather than 20 hectares 92 - 100 63318 87% 
Figure 1: Summary of Pastoral Properties in the Lake Taupo Catchment  (Hania, 2008) & (Hayward, 2011) 
 
2.1. Benchmarking and allocation based on historical nitrogen losses 
Benchmarking and allocation of nitrogen allowances to landowners in the Lake Taupo 
catchment follows a grandparenting scheme where historical nitrogen losses determine future 
nitrogen allowances. As will be further discussed later, this allocation method received resistance 
from those who found this form of allocation unfairly restrictive on historically non-intensive 
land uses and unfairly lenient on historically intensive land uses. These parties presented 
averaging or delayed averaging schemes as preferable alternatives for allocation.  It was ultimately 
decided to allocate allowances on an individual basis using historical benchmarking, which calls 
for estimating recent nitrogen losses based on a specific set of management practices to 
determine a farmer‟s maximum allowable nitrogen output going forward. 
Benchmarking on a case-by-case basis presents a particular challenge given uncertainty 
surrounding how particular land management practices translate into nitrogen losses. The fact 
that nitrogen losses are impacted not only by land management choices such as stocking rates 
and nitrogen fertiliser use, but also by uncontrollable factors such as the season, weather 
conditions and the property‟s proximity to the lake, further complicates the establishment of an 
individual nitrogen benchmark that will yield desired environmental outcomes. RPV5 
standardizes benchmarking across heterogeneous farms by specifying the use of AgResearch‟s 
                                                 
8 Following the finalisation of RPV5 on 7 July 2011, farmers have until 7 February 2012 to complete the 
benchmarking process and apply for a resource consent. As of July 2011, 97% of farms had completed the 
benchmarking process.  
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software tool Overseer™ (hereafter called Overseer). Overseer takes various management and 
environmental variables as inputs to generate an estimate of past nitrogen losses. As part of the 
catchment-wide cap, these estimates of past nitrogen losses determine a farm‟s initial NDA9. 
Any proposed land management changes, whether they will be undertaken independently 
or as part of a nitrogen trade, must be reassessed to demonstrate ongoing compliance with a 
farm‟s individual NDA and ensure that the catchment-wide cap is not exceeded. Farmers must 
outline the new practices in a nutrient management plan (NMP) and run Overseer to determine 
nitrogen losses that can be expected under the new management plan. NMPs are also required 
for approval in the event of purchasing or selling nitrogen allowances as is likely in the nitrogen 
trading market. 
 
2.2. Nitrogen trading market 
RPV5 grants farmers flexibility to deviate from their NDA by permitting those farmers 
to offset any nitrogen losses above and beyond their specified allowance by an equivalent 
corresponding decrease in nitrogen losses elsewhere in the catchment10. This essentially creates a 
nitrogen trading market, where farmers facing high nitrogen reduction costs in terms of output 
and profits may choose to buy nitrogen allowances from another farmer, and vice versa. 
 
2.2.1. Buyers and sellers in the market 
Buyers and sellers in the nitrogen trading market include those who perceive they have 
something to gain from changing management practices and trading their surplus or deficit of 
allowances with others. Sellers of nitrogen allowances might include farmers who have a 
relatively inexpensive way to reduce nitrogen losses and choose instead to discharge nitrogen 
below their initial allowance and sell the surplus nitrogen for a profit. Similarly, buyers are their 
natural counterpart; buyers are those farmers for whom more profits can be gained by 
intensifying production and paying for any additional nitrogen allowances needed by purchasing 
allowances from another farmer.  
                                                 
9 Landholders are free to choose any year-long period between July 2001 and June 2005 off of which to base the 
assessment of their historical nitrogen losses in order to determine their NDA going forward. 
10 Rule 3.10.5.7 provides flexibility for offsets (trades) among high nitrogen leaching farming activities deemed 
controlled activities by rules 3.10.5.3, 3.10.5.6, and 3.10.5.9. Note that rule 3.10.5.6 refers to the division of high 
leaching farms. See footnote 6 for more on descriptions of rules 3.10.5.5 and 3.10.5.9. RPV5 also allows for 
previously low nitrogen leaching farming activities to expand production and apply for a resource consent under 
rule 3.10.5.3 so long as they purchase nitrogen from a willing seller to offset their increase in nitrogen. 
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Another common buyer of allowances is the Lake Taupo Protection Trust (LTPT), a 
public fund jointly financed by national, regional and district government and charged with 
accomplishing the mandated 20% permanent reduction in nitrogen losses11. In addition to 
purchasing and converting land, LTPT purchases and permanently retires allowances available 
for sale, thus indirectly helping farmers gain a benefit from their nitrogen-reducing management 
changes.  
 
2.2.2. Format of nitrogen trading market 
Although RPV5 itself does not explicitly outline the infrastructure of the nitrogen trading 
market, WRC has established certain guidelines to enable trading to take place (Greenhalgh, 
2008a). An online guide for farmers outlines how the trading process should take place and what 
conditions would help a farmer gain from trade (Environment Waikato, 2009). WRC has 
established an online marketplace for the advertisement of NDAs offered for sale or sought for 
purchase12. This format allows all interested parties the ability to access information regarding 
who is offering NDAs for sale or for purchase, what is the proposed price and what is the length 
of the trade. All trades are permitted for a period of time up to but not beyond a common 
expiration date of July 2034 (Environment Court New Zealand, 2011). 
 
3. Policy evolution: successes, surprises, opportunities to improve 
The initial water quality concern for Lake Taupo evolved over the course of nearly a 
decade into the nitrogen management policy currently under implementation in the catchment. 
Extensive stakeholder engagement, 136 submissions to Waikato Regional Council and several 
months of Environment Court hearings went into developing the policy into its current state. 
While all parties expressed general support for taking action to preserve the quality of Lake 
Taupo‟s waters, there was less agreement about what form such a policy should take13. 
Understandably, landowners in the catchment expressed concern for what a limit on their 
allowable nitrogen discharge would mean for business, while others outside the catchment 
                                                 
11 Note the Lake Taupo Protection Trust aims to remove 20% of manageable nitrogen entering the lake, roughly 
100 tonnes nitrogen per year. 100 tonnes entering the lake equates roughly to 153 tonnes nitrogen per year 
occurring at the land surface level. See http://www.laketaupoprotectiontrust.org.nz/page/lake_27.php#purchase. 
12 See Waikato Regional Council http://www.waikatoregion.govt.nz/Templates/Public/Classified/Search.aspx  
13 Interview with Tim Bennetts, Local Government New Zealand and formerly of the Ministry for the 
Environment, 8 July 2011 
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echoed with concern for what a nutrient management policy within the catchment would mean 
for forestry and farming industries as other catchments followed suit. In order to better 
understand and evaluate the impact of the policy, it is important to provide context as to how 
certain key decisions were made and what factors drove those decisions. 
 
3.1. Lake Taupo Protection Trust and 20% nitrogen reduction target 
The decision to create a public fund to permanently remove 20% of nitrogen discharges 
from the catchment reflects a commitment to the water quality objective and to sharing the 
required economic costs among local, regional and central government.  
A return to the water quality levels of 2001 requires taking into consideration both 
previous and current land uses impacts. A simple cap alone would be insufficient to reverse the 
decline and restore 2001 water quality, since there remains a substantial amount of nitrogen 
progressing through a decades-long transit into the lake‟s waters. As stated in the final variation, 
the permanent removal of nitrogen intends to compensate for this nitrogen „load to come‟ and 
to ensure that the lake reaches long term equilibrium (Environment Court New Zealand, 2011). 
The exact percentage chosen reflects a balance between scientific knowledge of the 
environmental impact of nitrogen and the social implications of reduction (Young, 2007). The 
higher the reduction target, the greater the costs imposed on farmers, whose production levels 
and nitrogen discharges are closely correlated to production and revenue through stocking levels. 
On the other hand, there exists some scepticism about whether a 20% reduction target will be 
enough to fully compensate for the load to come. Scientific estimates for the exact percentage of 
the load to come range from 30% to 41% of the current manageable load, with other estimates 
as high as 80% (Hadfield et al., 2007). During the Environment Court hearings, a panel of 
scientists agreed that a 20% reduction would be sufficient for achieving medium-term 
environmental goals, but warned that the actual load to come over the medium term will most 
likely exceed 20% (Hadfield et al., 2007). In a situation where additional reductions would come 
at a greater social and economic cost, several sources indicated a preference for establishing the 
20% target in the interest of moving forward and leaving the option for future review as more 
scientific understanding becomes available14.  
The establishment of the Lake Taupo Protection Trust as the body responsible for 
funding and achieving the 20% reduction reflects a unique commitment on the part of 
government to ease the financial burden on landowners in the catchment. Central, regional and 
                                                 
14 Interview with Tim Bennetts, 8 July 2011 
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local governments each provide the Trust with 45%, 33% and 22% respectively, for a total of 
$81.5 million in yearly instalments terminating in 2018 (Environment Court New Zealand, 2011). 
In order to “minimise the cost of social change” the Trust funds nitrogen reductions instead of 
regulating that pastoral landowners themselves bear the costs (Environment Court New Zealand, 
2011). From a farming perspective, the cap alone imposes significant costs by placing a ceiling 
limit on production while costs of production continue to rise. To add the burden of 
downscaling production by 20% may have put farms out of business and threatened the viability 
of farming within the catchment. Others consider that it would be unfair to hold farmers 
accountable to pay the full cost of clean-up, since farm development was encouraged by the 
government as late as the 1980s and farmers were operating in good faith using what was 
understood at the time to comprise best management practices (Environment Court New 
Zealand, 2011). Government provision of public funds aims to ease the burden of social change 
and strike a balance between lake preservation and protection of social and economic well-being 
. Furthermore, joint oversight by central government, Waikato Regional Council, Taupo District 
Council and Ngati Tuwharetoa gives Tuwharetoa a valuable role as “core and equal players” in 
overseeing the Trust‟s operations and guiding decisions that impact the overall preservation of 
the lake15.  
 
3.2. Historical allocation versus averaging or delayed averaging  
The requirement under RPV5 to specify and hold landowners accountable to an 
individual nitrogen discharge allowance introduced several practical challenges and sources of 
disagreement. As an issue with strong economic and equity implications, determining how 
nitrogen allowances would be allocated across a wide variety of land uses and individual 
situations proved to be one of the most contentious issues in the development of the policy. 
As briefly mentioned, it was ultimately decided to use grandparenting or historical 
allocation method for nitrogen allowances. This method calls for allocating allowances at levels 
consistent with each land block‟s recent nitrogen discharges. In this way, all landowners receive 
equal treatment, since all are similarly restricted to their current chosen land use and none are 
required to make costly changes or to de-intensify (Counsel for the Waikato Regional Council, 
2008). Enabling farmers to continue operating at existing levels recognises and values 
investments they have made to maintain a certain level of production but still prevents further 
intensification. 
                                                 
15 Interview with Tim Bennetts, 8 July 2011 
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 Historical allocation, however, faced stiff resistance from those parties involved in less 
nitrogen intensive land uses who feared such allocation would severely limit their future 
development options. Owners of forested and undeveloped land did not want to see their land 
use options restricted by a 3 kg/ha/year nitrogen limit while farmers would be allocated between 
10 and 40 kg/ha/year and hence would maintain a greater range of land use options. These 
parties expressed frustration that they should be disadvantaged by allocation intended to correct 
damage that had been largely caused by farming, whether intentionally or not. Tuwharetoa forest 
trusts in particular felt that extensively forested areas, for example on the eastern side of the lake, 
had been deliberately planted in order to protect the water from the adverse impacts of land use, 
and that such protection should not go unrewarded in a policy meant to achieve a similar goal.  
Forestry groups such as Carter Holt Harvey (CHH) proposed as alternative allocation 
mechanisms averaging or delayed averaging. Under these mechanisms, all landowners would be 
held accountable to the same catchment-wide average nitrogen discharge limit, either 
immediately or some years in the future. These mechanisms would allocate excess nitrogen to 
forest owners and leave farmers with a nitrogen deficit, which would require them to either 
downscale or purchase additional nitrogen to continue operations. Although this would have had 
unequal distributive impacts, CHH considered this a fair way to enforce the polluter pays 
principle (Counsel for the Waikato Regional Council, 2008). However, just as the use of the term 
“polluter” proved ultimately toxic and inappropriate as applied to farmers exercising best 
practices in the catchment, similarly WRC determined to apply a grandparenting mechanism as 
the most equitable scheme which would cause the “least social disruption” (Young, 2007). 
In order to ease the restrictive nature of historical allocation on Tuwharetoa and other 
forest owners, RPV5 grants flexibility for developing undeveloped land. This rule allocates an 
extra 11,000 kg and 3,100 kg to the aggregate development of Maori and non-Maori lands, 
respectively. While this rule will have only a small impact on water quality, the flexibility could 
prove very valuable for undeveloped land owners (Vant, 2008). This flexibility could prove 
particularly valuable for collectively-owned Maori lands whose owners expect to own the land in 
perpetuity, and thus are very concerned with the future land options they could consider16. 
Several sources expressed that all allocation mechanisms inevitably create wins and losses for 
different landowners, and this case would be no different, however, solutions such as the 
flexibility rule and the establishment of the Lake Taupo Protection Trust would help to alleviate 
and reduce the strain of transitioning into a regulated environment for catchment stakeholders.  
                                                 
16 Email correspondence with Geoff Thorp, Forest Operations Manager for Lake Taupo Forest Trust, 17-18 August 
2011 
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3.3. Benchmarking and use of Overseer  
Historical allocation requires that all farms be allocated a nitrogen allowance or NDA 
consistent with their recent nitrogen output, a requirement that introduced a variety of 
theoretical and practical challenges17. It was initially assumed that each farm would be 
benchmarked based on averaging nitrogen discharges between July 2001 and June 2005, which 
are assumed to vary with climate and weather variations. During the submissions stage, Taupo 
Lake Care (TLC), an organisation of farmers within the catchment, launched a successful 
challenge against this benchmarking standard. TLC argued that farmers should be free to 
establish a benchmark based on any single year period within that time frame, and thus given the 
appropriate maximum allowance for which their farm had been established and investments had 
been made. TLC argued that to establish an NDA based on an average value would be to force a 
reduction in production in the best of years, while climate and weather conditions would 
naturally enforce additional reductions in the worst of years18. From a scientific standpoint, 
benchmarking based on the single best year would contribute an estimated extra 162 tonnes each 
year, having a moderate adverse effect on lake quality (Vant, 2008 and Ledgard, 2007). Other 
landowners expressed frustration to see this advantage so readily granted and to see some 
farmers benefitting from windfall gains from a generous allocation.  
Another practical challenge facing the establishment of individual allowances was to 
select an accurate means of modelling the relationship between past management decisions and 
the resulting nitrogen discharge. As mentioned before, Overseer was determined to be the best 
tool for taking various inputs to model expected nitrogen output on a case by case basis. 
Overseer demonstrates high performance in terms of a close correlation between measured and 
modelled nitrogen leaching and facilitates comparisons between different management practice 
options (Ledgard, 2007). However, the use of software to model nitrogen output presents several 
ongoing challenges. Its success relies on the accurate and complete disclosure of farm-specific 
information. For those farms with incomplete data, conservative default measures would be 
assumed, which could underestimate the nitrogen leached by an individual farm (Hania, 2008). 
Other farm management styles do not closely align to Overseers assumption, for example, those 
farms running a two year rotation or changing animal stocking numbers throughout each year.  
                                                 
17 NDA requirement not applicable to low-nitrogen leaching farms as permitted activities under rule 3.5.10.1 
18 Interview with Mike Barton, 14 July 2011 
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Ideally, Overseer software would fully account for new management practices, so that 
farmers get an accurate assessment of their nitrogen output and thus reap the benefits of any 
innovative nitrogen reducing changes made. However, until the scientific research is proven to 
the software developers and new versions are released and approved for use in assessing farm 
management plans, farms are limited to assessment using the specified version of Overseer. 
RPV5 specifies the use of a particular version of Overseer to ensure consistency among all the 
initial benchmarked NDAs. The ongoing challenge for WRC will be to assess management plan 
changes using the latest software compared to NDAs established using a previous version of 
Overseer.  
 
3.4. Trading System 
The establishment of the nitrogen cap and reduction target as well as benchmarking and 
allocation mechanisms attracted the greatest attention in the decision making process during the 
development of RPV5. Indeed, these elements have the greatest impact on the functioning and 
usefulness of the trading market insomuch as initial allocation determines whether an individual 
farmer will be in a position to buy, sell or maintain his or her allowance in order to achieve a 
certain level of production. However, no evaluation of the trading system would be complete 
without some description of the infrastructure itself that governs trading and how that 
infrastructure does or does not facilitate trading.  
Since consent-holding landowners are legally bound to the conditions of their consent 
under the Resource Management Act (RMA), the procedure for trading allowances involves 
applying for a resource consent change in addition to negotiating with another trading partner on 
the conditions of trade. Both trading parties must apply for a section 127 resource consent 
change under the RMA. This process requires both parties to submit a proposed NDA and 
corresponding nitrogen management plan prepared using Overseer to demonstrate how the farm 
will operate within their proposed NDA. Allowances can be leased on a short-term basis or sold 
for the duration of the resource consent, all of which expire after 25 years19.  Concerns existed 
that this method of trading would be too cumbersome and unsophisticated to facilitate effective 
trading among farmers. However, this process introduces few additional costs above and beyond 
                                                 
19 See appendix ‎6.5 for a timeline of important events in the development of RPV5 
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the original costs of benchmarking and compliance with the conditions of consent, which all 
consented landowners would face with or without trading activity (Hania, 2008)20.  
On the other hand, since the value of one unit of nitrogen varies across farm locations 
and management practices, an effectively functioning market should work to gradually move 
nitrogen around the catchment from where reductions are least costly and towards where 
nitrogen is most highly valued (Young et al., 2010). In this way, trading could grant farmers 
flexibility and give them an incentive to make decisions and change management practices in 
order to reduce costs and maximize profits, the benefits of which could outweigh the additional 
costs of applying for an altered resource consent. Whether or not the trading system has 
facilitated options and improved outcomes for farmers operating within a capped environment 
remains a key question in evaluating the policy so far.  
 
4. Evaluation of policy impact 
As the first nutrient trading system among diffuse non-point sources of nitrogen, it is not 
immediately obvious how to assess the success or failure of that system. Nitrogen trading within 
the catchment cap on discharges has the potential to not only facilitate water quality objectives, 
but also to ease the impact of the regulation on those landowners most affected by its 
restrictions. The explicit goal of the trading system is to provide flexibility for landowners to 
make land use and management practices changes while preserving the overall nitrogen cap 
established for the catchment (Counsel for the Waikato Regional Council, 2008). Beyond the 
capability of the policy to facilitate flexibility for capped landowners, a trading system could have 
the added benefit of providing incentives for research and discovery nitrogen reduction 
possibilities, that is to find cost effective ways to reduce nitrogen output in hopes of securing 
financial gains from sales of excess nitrogen and work towards the quality of the lake. It is with 
these two criteria in mind, providing flexibility and fostering innovation, that the nitrogen trading 
system can be evaluated. More broadly, the policy in general can be assessed against its water 
quality objectives and intention to minimize and distribute economic and social costs.  
                                                 
20 Hania estimates that administrative fees associated with applying for a resource consent change could amount to 
$400. Benchmarking could cost a farm between $2,500 and $10,000, processing consents could total between 
$600-$1,700 and that annual consent holder charges could total $400. WRC implementation manager Natasha 
Hayward estimates these costs to total closer to $1,000 - $1,500. Note that the Lake Taupo Protection Trust has 
agreed to shoulder the cost of benchmarking for those farms greater than 20 ha in size, in order to further ease the 
financial burden associated with compliance under RPV5. 
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4.1. General findings 
Not surprisingly, the imposition of the policy has prompted a variety of positive and 
negative reactions from various landowners, reactions that are by no means uniform within a 
single group of landowners. Although it remains early for an assessment of environmental 
outcomes, the policy has successfully limited increases in nitrogen leaching that would have 
otherwise been expected in the absence of regulation, particularly from the expansion of dairy 
farming. In this way, the cap has proven effective in halting further in land development and 
increases in nitrogen discharges. In terms of achieving the reduction target, as of July 2011 the 
Lake Taupo Protection Trust had entered into agreements to remove 100 tonnes of nitrogen and 
remains ahead of schedule in securing its required 153 tonnes of nitrogen reductions by 2018. 
Initial reductions came from the sale and conversion of several whole farms, but over time have 
shifted to partial farm conversions where farmers plant trees on less-productive marginal lands, 
reduce their effective nitrogen output and sell surplus allowances to the Trust. About 3,000 ha 
have been converted into forestry and 16,000 have undergone management changes. Together, 
these changes have affected approximately 36% of the total 52,500 ha of effective pastoral land 
in the catchment. Although the Trust has exhibited positive performance on its progress to date, 
its management remains cognizant that the final reductions will prove more difficult than the 
first. 
Despite only recent implementation of the policy following 10 years of development, 
implementation progress is well underway. Roughly 97% of pastoral lands in the catchment have 
been preliminarily benchmarked with 67% having completed nitrogen management plans and 30 
total consents granted, the final stage in the process (Hayward, 2011)21.  
 
4.2. Trading activity 
Trading activity itself has been “a bit of a non-event, other than the Trust being in the 
market.22” Most trading activity thus far has consisted of farmers selling allowances to the Trust 
or to a dairy farmer in the catchment, the second of the two largest players in the market. While 
the dairy farmer negotiates deals on a case-by-case and confidential basis, the Trust has 
established a standard price of $400 kg/ha/year paid over time, estimated to equate to an 
                                                 
21 Email correspondence with Natasha Hayward, WRC Programme Manager 17-18 August  2011 
22 Interview with Graeme Fleming, CEO of Lake Taupo Protection Trust, 15 July 2011 
NZARES Conference 2011 Draft – Comments welcome 
16 
 
upfront price of roughly $300/kg/year23. Most trades have been long term sales lasting the 
duration of the resource consent, a reflection of the long term nature of capital investments 
made to farms to accommodate certain production levels24.  
Other one-to-one sales besides those involving these two major players have been 
virtually non-existent, though not necessarily a signal of market failure (Greenhalgh, 2008a). It 
could be that high transaction costs and imperfect information regarding how the trading system 
functions would discourage trading activity and cause market failure (Selman et al., 2007). This 
explanation is unlikely, however, as the costs of participating in the market add few costs above 
and beyond those already borne by consented landowners. Furthermore, farmers have 
demonstrated a remarkably high level of understanding of how the trading system operates25. 
 Another explanation is that limited trading could simply reflect an immature market or 
that the cap is not yet binding on farmers, perhaps due to benchmarking based on the single best 
year, which has had “a big effect, a very big effect.26” However, as uncapped famers nationwide 
increase their productivity and Taupo famers seek additional allowances to stay competitive, we 
could observe additional trading activity going forward. Indeed we already see this occurring in 
cases where a dairy farming operation has profitably expanded by purchasing nitrogen from 
presumably less profitable uses elsewhere in the catchment. While trades with the Trust are 
noteworthy in that they represent permanent removal of nitrogen from the catchment due to 
disparate management practice changes, trades with the dairy farmer represent instances where 
nitrogen reductions are able to occur at least cost and to provide farmers with flexibility to 
expand or contract their businesses in response to changing economic conditions and personal 
circumstances.  
 
4.3. Farming perspective 
Although the initial reaction of farming to the policy was largely negative, relations and 
perceptions have improved over time as the policy has evolved and concerns have been voiced 
and considered (Young et al., 2010). Now that the ten year period of deliberation and 
development has come to a close, many farmers express an acceptance for the policy and a 
desire to move on. Others, however, exhibit continued frustration with the inconveniences and 
                                                 
23 Interview with Graeme Fleming, 15 July 2011 & Interview with Mike Barton 14 July 2011. For the purposes of 
valuation of consented land with a particular NDA, valuation company Landmass Technology assumes a sale price 
of $300 kg/ha/year and a purchase price of $330 kg/ha/year to account for risk. See section ‎4.4 for more detail. 
24 Interview with Mike Barton, 14 July 2011 
25 Interview with Mike Barton, 14 July 2011 
26 Interview with Graeme Fleming, 15 July 2011  
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costs of carrying out farming as a consented activity, something not required of competing 
farmers outside the catchment. Graeme Fleming of the Lake Taupo Protection Trust expressed 
optimism for the catchment as a whole, saying that fears of negative social impacts due to the 
widespread end of farming were alleviating. Indeed, the existence of a single highly active dairy 
farmer in the market provides positive evidence that even intensive farming can continue within 
the boundaries of the policy, although others remain acutely aware that dairy intensification is 
necessarily complemented by de-intensification elsewhere in the catchment as facilitated by 
trading. Though it remains to be seen over time what the true impact of the policy will mean for 
farming in the catchment, initial reactions are that the policy and the trading system have enabled 
flexibility and provided options for remaining viable within the cap, at least in the short term. 
The policy has thus far enabled farmers to undertake a variety of land use and 
management changes, positive evidence that the policy has facilitated flexibility. Some 
landowners have exited the catchment while others have maintained, reduced or even expanded 
production. Those farmers exiting the catchment have largely transacted with the Trust, as few 
others have bought into the catchment in recent years. In these transactions, the Trust has 
funded business consultants, encouraged farmers to fully consider their decision and offered 
competitive prices to ensure that any such deals not only remove nitrogen from the catchment, 
but also ease the financial and social burden imposed on framers.  
Although the Trust has facilitated land use changes to willing sellers in this way, both 
sellers and those who remain in the catchment express negativity to see neighbours removed 
from the catchment and to see productive and attractive farmland purchased and converted to 
forestry. One farming couple expressed feeling pressure to exit the catchment. Seeing properties 
failing to sell and limited by an inability to wait for the development of alternative management 
practices, this couple decided to exit the catchment, leaving not only a business, but also a home 
behind. In some cases, movement out of the catchment has split up communities and impacted 
those remaining in the catchment. Another farmer emphasized that to see farmers go “has hit 
me quite hard” and the imposition of the policy overall with no recognition of the hardship it 
entails has dampened his enthusiasm and mental well-being.  
 For other landowners, the imposition of the policy and option to sell allowances to the 
Trust has provided the opportunity to consider management changes in coordination with selling 
allowances to the Trust. Some farmers have reduced production or stocking rates, while others 
have planted portions of their land in forest and sold excess nitrogen to the Trust. As in the 
latter case, many conversions have occurred on marginal or less productive lands, leaving the 
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remaining productive land to be farmed in a more efficient manner27. These partial conversions 
hint at efficiency gains, where trading has moved nitrogen from less productive uses and 
reserved it for more productive uses. Interactions with the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
have made the option of partial plantings more attractive. In deals facilitated by the Trust, 
landowners plant portions of their land in forestry, sell nitrogen to the Trust and sell carbon 
credits to nearby power companies held accountable for sourcing carbon credits under the ETS, 
reaping a dual benefit from the planting of trees28.  
As with the conversion of whole farms into forested lands, the conversion of attractive 
and productive farmland into forestry has provoked negative psychological reactions from some 
landowners who question the benefits of planting in forestry and calls into question the long 
term future of farming in the catchment. While many have come to see the necessity of the 
regulation, accept its limitations and seek the opportunities it could provide, others remain 
sceptical about the general approach of converting into forestry, hoping that future hindsight will 
not provide a sense of regret to have lost productive farmland in exchange for plantation forests. 
Furthermore, this option remains more feasible for those farmlands with marginal lands available 
for conversion, but may not as readily apply to smaller farms limited by space and by the number 
of carbon credits they could offer to carbon credit-seeking companies. Finally, the ability to seek 
such opportunities is to a large extent dependent on initial allocation. Those landowners which 
for whatever reason were allocated a relatively low initial nitrogen allocation have fewer options 
compared to landowners with greater NDAs, perhaps due to capital constraints or an abnormally 
unproductive year during the benchmarking period. In this way, the implementation of historical 
allocation has differentially impacted various landowners in the catchment.   
Despite mixed reactions and experiences caused by the imposition of RPV5, the policy 
impacts farmers equally in one significant way: by providing certainty to consent-holders. The 
lengthy development process saw many farmers stalled in uncertainty, unsure of whether to 
invest in farm improvements and unsure of their future viability in the catchment. This situation 
has given way to a feeling of certainty felt by those holding a 25 year resource consent to farm. 
Compared to other locations around the country facing the potential restrictions as a result of 
new environmental policy, farmers in the Taupo catchment hold resources consent that 
guarantee them certain rights and expectations for operating their businesses relatively far into 
the future. In contrast, other catchments may or may not see mandated management practices or 
                                                 
27 Interview with Graeme Fleming, 15 July 2011  
28 See (Media Release: Carbon Transactin Supports Environmental Benefits to Lake Taupo, 2010) for a description 
of one such deal involving interactions between nitrogen and carbon markets. 
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other restrictive policies that will impact day to day farming practices more invasively than 
RPV5.  Although the certainty granted by RPV5 comes at additional expense and recordkeeping 
requirements, the policy allows farmer to remain responsible for their own decisions without 
being told how to run their business, one reason that TLC supported a trading system over other 
alternatives from the start29. 
 
4.4. Impact on land values 
Although the introduction of the trading system has for the most part effectively opened 
up options for catchment landowners, those options remain to some extent limited by other 
elements of the policy. Limitations on the amount of nitrogen various land blocks can discharge 
which equate roughly to productive potential, has impacted land values. While the group 
responsible for valuing land in the catchment contends that the impact has been ambiguous 
compared to similar land outside the catchment, others believe that land values have suffered a 5 
to 10% reduction30. For those sheep and beef farmers in the business primarily for capital gains, 
a reduction in the value of their land because they cannot sell to profitable dairy uses without 
purchasing additional allowances has very real implications for financial security and retirement 
options31. Because the value of land is closely linked to the nitrogen allowance assigned, those 
lands assigned a below average allowance compared to lands with similar characteristics 
experience a greater decline in the value of their land32. In this way, landowners experience not 
only different impacts of the policy in terms of their productive capacity and ability to trade, but 
also different long term impacts in terms of what they can expect to earn from the sale of that 
land.  
 
4.5. Ngati Tuwharetoa and forestry perspective 
As feared during development, non-farming Tuwharetoa landowners and other forestry 
owners have seen their future land use options restricted by the nitrogen cap. Background 
leaching rates for unimproved and forestry land are assumed to be 2 and 3 kg/ha/year 
respectively. Without increasing nitrogen discharges under the development flexibility rule, these 
                                                 
29 Interview with Mike Barton, 14 July 2011 
30 Phone conversation with Mark Grinlinton of Landmass Technology, Ltd., 15 August 2011 and Interview with 
Graeme Fleming, 15 July 2011 
31 For example, assume that a farmer has an assigned NDA of 24 kg/ha/year. In order to sell to dairy, that land 
would need an allowance of about 35 kg/ha/year. Upgrading that land to dairy would cost an additional $300 * 11 
= $3300 per hectare/year if allowances were purchased to enable such an intensive use. 
32 Phone conversation with Mark Grinlinton and presentation explaining the valuation method used in Taupo 
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limits essentially lock those landowners into low nitrogen leaching uses in perpetuity. The 
flexibility rule established for development of Maori and non-Maori lands is designed to facilitate 
future land use options rather than to provide short term financial gain by allowing landowners 
to sell this limited development allowance33. While this flexibility remains limited to an additional 
2 kg/ha/year above background leaching rates, it provides useful options for those large land 
blocks that can consider intensive development on a portion of that land block which would 
average out over the entire block. However, those smaller block owners may have less 
opportunities to make such land use changes34. To date, none have taken advantage of the 
additional tonnage allotted to previously undeveloped and forested land35. Nevertheless the rule 
has indeed provided some limited flexibility by introducing the possibility of conversions to 
residential and tourism uses in the future36.  
From an environmental perspective, some Tuwharetoa stakeholders in the catchment 
would have liked to see a greater commitment to responsible stewardship of Lake Taupo, 
particularly in the form of a higher nitrogen reduction target. Acknowledging that nitrogen 
reductions do not come easily and usually come at a cost to business, George Asher defends that 
protection of the lake nevertheless presents a “challenging obligation on everybody” and that 
“nobody should shun their responsibility for responsible stewardship”37. Tuwharetoa landowners 
themselves have made land use decisions in order to deliberately protect the lake, often at the 
expense of potential commercial gain. Potentially productive lands, especially on the eastern side 
of the lake, were instead planted into forestry with the goal of reducing negative environmental 
impacts on both lake and land. As Asher explains, “commercial gain didn‟t enter the picture,” 
saying that for Tuwharetoa landowners, the “perspective is quite different from a normal 
landowner perspective.38”  
In other ways, the introduction of the policy has had lesser negative impacts on 
Tuwharetoa landowners. As landowners with collective-ownership and hence a longer term 
perspective than other private landowners, any reductions in land value due to the restrictions of 
the policy have been less of an imposition. Furthermore, long term nitrogen reduction schemes 
which involve reverting to forestry and reaping a dual nitrogen and carbon income may appear 
                                                 
33 See footnote 7 for a description of the flexibility rule 
34 Email correspondence with Geoff Thorp, 17-18 August 2011 
35 Interview with Natasha Hayward,  9 August 2011 
36 Interview with George Asher, CEO of Lake Taupo Forest Trust, 8 August 2011 & Interview with Geoff Thorp, 
15 July 2011 & Interview with Natasha Hayward 9 August 2011 
37 Interview with George Asher, CEO of Lake Taupo Forest Trust, 8 August 2011  
38 Interview with George Asher, CEO of Lake Taupo Forest Trust, 8 August 2011 
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more attractive to those Maori farmers motivated by both environmental reasons and a longer 
term perspective towards land ownership.  
 
4.6. Lake Taupo Protection Trust 
The Lake Taupo Protection Trust has garnered much enthusiasm for its performance so 
far as an instrumental player in the implementation of the policy39. In a combination of 
purchasing and on selling land and purchasing and retiring nitrogen allowances, the Trust has 
permanently removed 100 tonnes of nitrogen from the catchment. 13 deals have been 
completed, 5 of which have consisted of whole farm purchases and 8 of which have consisted of 
nitrogen allowance purchases. These transactions have removed between 3 and 22 tonnes each, 
with most clustered on the lower end of that scale40.  
Several factors, both by design and by chance, have facilitated such transactions. On the 
one hand, the Trust has committed to providing business consultants and encouraging 
prospective sellers to thoroughly consider the implications of their choice. Secondly, offering 
payments over time has enabled farmers to gradually reduce stock numbers rather than having to 
make sudden and costly changes41. Most significantly, the introduction of synergy with the ETS 
allows farmers to earn income from both nitrogen allowances and carbon credits sold. Both of 
these factors have made selling nitrogen an attractive opportunity from a business standpoint. 
While purchases of entire farms was neither financially sustainable for the Trust nor positively 
received by those farmers disappointed to see their neighbours go, management practice changes 
that allow farmers to continue their operations and sell only excess nitrogen to the Trust provide 
a more favourable alternative, and we are seeing more of such deals occur over time42.  
Despite substantial progress towards its reduction goal, the Trust faces a considerable 
challenge going forward. While the $72 million actual endowment of the Trust remains a fixed 
pool of money, a recent increase in the targeted reduction has sparked concern about the 
funding available to finance remaining nitrogen reductions43. It was initially assumed that 153 
tonnes would need to be removed, however completion of benchmarking including the single 
best year benchmarking standard has necessitated that an additional 30 tonnes be removed. 
Because the Trust receives its funding in $6 million yearly increments, there is a limit to the 
                                                 
39 Interviews with George Asher, 8 August 2011 and Geoff Thorp 14 July 2011. 
40 Interview with Graeme Fleming, 15 July 2011. See appendix ‎6.6 for a summary of nitrogen removed thus far. 
41 Interview with Graeme Fleming, 15 July 2011 
42 Interview with Graeme Fleming, 15 July 2011 
43 $72 million represents the committed $81.5 million less GST 
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number of deals that can be paid for at any one time (Kneebone, 2009). The Lake Taupo 
Protection Trust has recently decided to initiate a community engagement exercise to generate 
innovative ideas and strategies for the last 85 tonnes. As an example, smaller blocks could pool 
nitrogen reductions together and to reduce the legal costs per kg of transacting with Trust 
compared to those that would be incurred from individual transactions.  
  
4.7. Innovative responses 
In addition to enabling land use and management practice changes, the introduction of 
the policy and motivation to protect the lake has facilitated innovative responses and ongoing 
research into alternative management practices. The Trust has dedicated up to $5 million over its 
lifetime to researching low nitrogen alternative land uses within the catchment. Potential 
solutions include nitrification inhibitors such as DCD, high sugar grasses, and cut and carry 
lucerne which would take up a large amount of nitrogen leached and then be exported out of the 
catchment. While research within the catchment has yet to provide any clear alternative crops or 
management practices, many express optimism that the possibility of reducing nitrogen to make 
the excess available for trade could encourage farmers to “think outside the box” and generate 
solutions that didn‟t previously exist. 
In addition to ongoing research and innovative solutions linking nitrogen and carbon 
credits, some farmers have begun to explore green marketing solutions, hoping to differentiate 
and earn a premium on their product. One such example comes in the form of Taupo Beef, a 
project initiated by two farming families in the catchment. Marketing the beef as local and 
sustainable in terms of protecting Lake Taupo‟s water quality, these families have received 
positive response and feedback that at least some people are willing to pay a premium in order to 
support products produced in an environmental manner. In this way, farmers could recover the 
costs associated with reducing their nitrogen discharge or increasing their nitrogen discharge by 
purchasing additional nitrogen. While some remain sceptical that alternative management 
solutions and green marketing of products will enable farming to remain viable within a cap on 
nitrogen, these instances do provide positive evidence for the future of farming in Taupo. 
 
4.8. Lingering concerns and future challenges 
Although implementation progress to date has been positive, there remain several 
challenges that will impact the success of the policy in the long run. As more scientific data is 
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gathered and our understanding of the impact of land use activities on water quality improves, it 
could be that a higher reduction target is required. Since it will be a long time before the 
adequacy of the 20% target is confirmed or invalidated, environmental groups such as 
Environment Defence Society remains convinced that a higher target is already justified  
(Environmental Defence Society, 2004). Any increase in the reduction target necessarily implies 
additional social and economic costs, and it remains to be seen how these will be distributed and 
how the regulation will be redesigned to accommodate any such changes.  
Similarly, the possibility of spatial variation of the impact of nitrogen presents an 
additional future challenge. It could be that the spatial movement of nitrogen around the 
catchment would have adverse environmental consequences, even if the total amount leached 
remains the same. For example, “hotspots” of high nitrogen concentration could develop in bays 
nearby intensively farmed areas. While spatial considerations were initially dismissed because of 
fairness and equity concerns, it may be that future policy versions need to consider spatial 
variation by introducing different regulations for sub-catchments or trading ratios to allow 
trading while accounting for spatial variation. However, such additional features could increase 
the complexity and transaction costs of making a trade, which could have the adverse effect of 
discouraging trading activity. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Certain critical elements have enabled the policy to transition from an initial water quality 
concern to a comprehensive nutrient management scheme some ten years later. One such 
element was that all stakeholder groups were aligned in their desire to protect the lake, which 
provided common ground and enabled parties to focus attention on how to achieve that goal 
rather than debating the motivation for action (Counsel for the Waikato Regional Council, 2008). 
Throughout the development process, extensive stakeholder meetings and a high level of 
involvement enabled parties to voice their concerns and to gain an understanding of the issues at 
stake. As one example, TLC represented some 90% of the catchment‟s farmers, and thus was 
able to effectively represent the concerns of the farming community (Young, 2007). Cooperation 
and partnership between different government agencies, as well as strong and consistent 
leadership in key development and implementation positions has helped move the process 
along44. A four-way partnership between national, regional, district level governments and Ngati 
                                                 
44 Interview with Natasha Hayward, 9 August 2011 and Interview with Mike Barton 14 August 2011 
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Tuwharetoa leadership has further facilitated cooperation and ensured that relevant stakeholders 
remain involved45. Practically speaking, the ability and willingness of the government to fund 
reductions and remove the financial burden from farmers has been a key element, as had the 
unexpected but providential introduction of the ETS and the range of possibilities it has 
provided. 
Looking critically at the design and impact of the policy, certain key lessons and 
opportunities emerge. Graeme Fleming applauds the success of the program for generating quick 
results stemming from a policy design that combines a regulatory component with an 
appropriate incentive structure46. Some remain dissatisfied with the regulation and would like to 
see a tighter cap imposed and more responsibility for reductions borne by farmers, who although 
relieved of the label “polluters” and having developed their farms in good faith, are generally 
understood to be the primary source of nitrogen discharges. Others would like to see incentives 
to innovate encouraged rather than stifled or limited by the rigid benchmarking process that 
cannot take into consideration potential but unproven mitigation strategies47. Furthermore, the 
process of applying for an updated resource consent to finalise trades could prove to be an 
unnecessarily cumbersome process, and WRC is committed to streamlining the process as much 
as possible to ensure that the trading infrastructure itself does not skew incentives to trade48.  
Overall, the progress of the nitrogen trading system in Lake Taupo presents a compelling 
case for the feasibility of implementing a non-point source trading program as a nutrient 
management solution. As previously stated, the relative newness of the policy overall and 
immaturity of the market caution against concluding too soon whether or not the program has 
been a success or failure. Indeed, as time moves on, the impact of the policy on landowners and 
the frequency and nature of trades could look very different. For example, as the Trust exits the 
market having completed its nitrogen reduction target or as the cap becomes binding and 
farmers are forced to consider purchasing additional nitrogen or downscaling or closing their 
businesses, we could see other players more actively engaged as purchasers of nitrogen. At least 
in the short term, the trading system and activity of the Trust have effectively provided 
landowners with additional flexibility to change management practices or pursue alternative land 
uses. 
  
                                                 
45 Interview with George Asher, 8 August 2011 
46 Interview 15 July 2011 
47 Phone conversation with Suzie Greenhalgh, Senior Economist at Landcare Research, 1 August 2011 
48 Interview with Natasha Hayward, 9 August 2011 
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6. Appendices 
6.1. Map of catchment land uses over time49 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Source: http://www.waikatoregion.govt.nz/Environmental-information/Rivers-lakes-and-wetlands/Learn-about-
our-lakes/Lake-Taupo/How-land-use-affects-Lake-Taupo/ 
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6.2. Map of catchment highlighting NDAs50  
  
                                                 
50 Map courtesy of Waikato Regional Council 
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6.3. Breakdown of land uses in the catchment51 
Land Use 
Tuwharetoa Land 
(hectares) 
Government Land 
(hectares) 
Privately Owned 
Land (hectares) 
Total 
Percent of 
land in each 
use 
Undeveloped 50840 103660 0 154500 56% 
Planted forests 35500 4300 24700 64500 23% 
Sheep and beef 23800 14800 12100 50700 18% 
Dairy 778 0 1022 1800 1% 
Urban 0 0 3500 3500 1% 
Total 110918 122760 41322 275000   
Percent of land held 
by each landowner 
category 
40% 45% 15%   
 
 
  
                                                 
51 (Young, 2007) page 6 
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6.4. Breakdown of sources of nitrogen in the catchment52  
  Source 
Load of N Effective Yield 
% Total % Category 
(tonnes/year) (kg N/ha/year) 
U
n
m
a
n
a
g
e
a
b
le
 l
o
a
d
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
(n
a
tu
ra
l)
 
Atmospheric deposition 272 4.4 20% 34% 
Undeveloped land 311 2 23% 39% 
Pine on unimproved land 122 2 9% 15% 
Tongariro Power Development 87   6% 11% 
Pine on unimproved pasture 12 2.7 1% 1% 
  Subtotal 804   59%   
M
a
n
a
g
e
a
b
le
 l
o
a
d
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
(h
u
m
a
n
-i
n
d
u
c
ed
) 
P
as
to
ra
l 
U
se
s Non-dairy pasture 442 8.6 33% 79% 
Dairy pasture 68 29 5% 12% 
Urban runoff 16 8 1% 3% 
Sewage 17   1% 3% 
Pine on improved pasture 6 4.2 - 6.0 53 0.4% 1% 
Nitrogen-fixing scrub 7 12 0.5% 1% 
  Subtotal 556   41%   
      Total 1360   100%   
                                                 
52 See (Environmental Court, 2008) page 17 
53 Note that pine on improved pasture is assumed to trend down to 3 kg/ha/year long term average. For discussion see (Environmental Court, 2008) pages 37-40 & 71. 
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6.5. Timeline of important events in development of RPV5 
1955 160 km2 of catchment land in developed pasture 
1973 470 km2 of catchment land in developed pasture 
2002 525 km2 of catchment land in developed pasture54 
 
1998 
WRC enters Memorandum of Understanding with 
Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board (TMTB) 
2000 
Start of technical investigations into land use impacts on 
lake water quality, key stakeholders notified of impact of 
land use on lake water quality55 
Sept 2000 
“Issues and Options for Managing Water Quality in Lake 
Taupo” circulated to determine public attitudes towards 
water quality options56 
Sept 2001 
WRC Council resolution to “maintain water quality by 
reducing nitrogen output from existing land uses and 
preventing further land use intensification57 
Feb 2001 – Feb 2005 
35 consultative meetings between WRC, Taupo Lake Care 
(TLC) and farms systems experts58 
9 July 2005 Notification of RPV5 
9 Feb 2007 Lake Taupo Protection Trust established59 
15 March 2007 Waikato Regional Council decision released 
May – June 2008 Environment Court hearings 
12 Nov 2008 Environment Court releases interim decisions 
17 June 2011 Finalisation of RPV5 in Environmental Court 
7 July 2011 RPV5 fully operative 
7 Feb 2012 
All farmers must have applied for resource consents with 
WRC 
2018 Reassessment of 20% nitrogen reduction target60 
July 2034 Common expiration of all NDAs61 
                                                 
54 (Young, 2007) page 7 
55 (Young, 2007) page 5 & 14 
56 (Young, 2007) page 15 
57 (Young, 2007) page 15 
58 (Young, 2007) page 20 
59 (Young, 2007) page 24 
60 (Environment Court New Zealand, 2011) page 14 
61 (Environment Court New Zealand, 2011) page 10 
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6.6. Lake Taupo Protection Trust Nitrogen Purchases 
 
 
 
  
22,000 
17,000 
12,019 
7,042 
7,000 
7,000 
4,000 
3,000 
Nitrogen
Removed
Remaining
Nitrogen
-
20,000 
40,000 
60,000 
80,000 
100,000 
120,000 
140,000 
160,000 
180,000 
200,000 
N
it
ro
g
e
n
 (
k
g
)
Nitrogen Purchases and Progress to Date
85,039
100,961
NZARES Conference 2011 Draft – Comments welcome 
31 
 
7. References 
 
2010. "Media Release: Carbon Transactin Supports Environmental Benefits to Lake Taupo," . 
Available online at 
http://www.mightyriverpower.co.nz/Generation/News/NewsArchive2010/Detail.a
spx?id=2288. 
Counsel for the Waikato Regional Council. 2008. "Outline of Submissions of Counsel for the 
Waikato Regional Council," Before the Environment Court, Environment Court, 
Hamilton. 
Environment Court New Zealand. 2011. "Proposed Waikato Regional Plan Variation 5 - Lake 
Taupo Catchment," . 
Environment Waikato. 2003. Protecting Lake Taupo: A Long Term Partnership, Hamilton: 
Environment Waikato. Available online at 
http://www.ew.govt.nz/PageFiles/7058/strategy.PDF. 
Environment Waikato. 2009. Nitrogen Management in the Lake Taupo Catchment: Proposed Waikato 
Regional Plan Variation 5, Hamilton: Environment Waikato. Available online at 
http://www.ew.govt.nz/PageFiles/183/Taupo%20Revised%20Guide%20to%20Far
mingAUG09.pdf.PDF. 
Environment Waikato. 2010. "Nitrogen Sourcing and Trading in the Lake Taupo Catchment," . 
Available online at 
http://www.ew.govt.nz/PageFiles/15237/Nitrogen%20trading%20in%20the%20La
ke%20Taupo%20catchment.pdf. 
Environmental Court. 2008. "Interim Decision of the Environment Court," Environment Court, 
Auckland. 
Environmental Defence Society. 2004. "EDS Submissions to Environment Waikato on the Lake 
Taupo Strategy," . Available online at 
http://www.eds.org.nz/eresources/submissions.cfm?content_id=110393. 
Greenhalgh, Suzie. 2008a. "Statement of Evidence of Sue Elisa Greenhalgh," before the 
Environment Court, January 2008. 
Greenhalgh, Suzie. 2008b. "Statement of Rebuttal Evidence of Sue Elisa Greenhalgh," before 
the Environment Court, April 2008. 
Hadfield, John; Warwick Sylvester; William Nisbet Vant and Paul White. 2007. "Statement of 
Agreed Matters Between Technical Experts for the Appellants and Respondent," . 
Hania, Jan Johannes. 2008. "Statement of Evidence of Jan Johannes Hania," . 
Hayward, Natasha. 2011. "Report to Lake Taupo Protection Trust," . 
Kneebone, John T. 2009. "Lake Taupo Protection Trust - Chairman's Report, 2009," Lake 
Taupo Protection Trust. Available online at 
NZARES Conference 2011 Draft – Comments welcome 
32 
 
http://www.laketaupoprotectiontrust.org.nz/file/chairmans-report-for-the-year-
ended-30-june-09.pdf. 
Ledgard, Stewart F. 2007. "Statement of Evidence of Stewart Francis Ledgard," . 
Petch, Tony; Justine Young; Bruce Thorrold and Bill Vant. 2003. "Protecting an Icon: Managing 
Sources of Diffuse Nutrient Inflow to Lake Taupo, New Zealand," in Diffuse Pollution 
Conference, 1C Water Resources Management ed.  Diffuse Pollution Conference, 
Dublin 2003, University College Dublin, Dublin, pp. 1-50-1-55. Available online at 
http://www.ucd.ie/dipcon/docs/theme01/theme01_10.PDF. 
Selman, Mindy; Suzie Greenhalgh; Evan Branosky; Cy Jones and Jenny Guiling. 2007. "An 
Overview of Water Quality Trading," World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. 
Vant, William Nisbet. 2008. "Statement of Evidence of William Nisbet Vant," before the 
Environment Court, January 2008. 
Yerex, Sue. 2009. "Protecting Lake Taupo - The Strategy and the Lessons," . Available online at 
http://www.ew.govt.nz/PageFiles/7058/ProtectingLakeTaupopublication.pdf. 
Young, Justine. 2007. "Statement of Evidence of Justine Young," before the Environment 
Court, January 2007. 
Young, Justine; Geoff Kaine and Environment Waikato. 2010. Application of the Policy Choice 
Framework to Lake Taupo Catchment, 20 ed., Hamilton: Environment Waikato. 
 
 
